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Abstract. Phishing attacks are the primary cause of data and security breaches in
businesses, public institutions, and private life. Due to inherent limitations and
users’ high susceptibility to increasingly sophisticated phishing attempts,
existing anti-phishing measures cannot realize their full potential. Against this
background, we utilize methods from the emerging research field of Explainable
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) for the design of a user-focused anti-phishing
measure. By leveraging the power of state-of-the-art phishing detectors, our
approach uncovers the words and phrases in an e-mail most relevant for
identifying phishing attempts. We empirically show that our approach reliably
extracts segments of text considered relevant for the discrimination between
genuine and phishing e-mails. Our work opens up novel prospects for phishing
prevention and demonstrates the tremendous potential of XAI methods beyond
applications in AI.
Keywords: Phishing Prevention, Explainable Artificial Intelligence,
Interpretable Machine Learning, User-Centric XAI

1

Introduction

During the first weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic, a large number of US citizens
received an e-mail ostensibly from their employers’ payroll department. The e-mail
informed them that the federal government was considering a financial relief package,
entitling them to a $1000 check. In order to benefit from this measure, they would need
to verify “their email account for new payroll directory” by following a “Secure Link”
included in the e-mail [1]. These e-mails are exemplary for a phishing attack: To gain
sensitive information for malicious purposes, the sender imitates a trustworthy source
and promises a personal benefit to deceive the user [2, 3].
Phishing attacks are the primary way in which identity theft and security breaches
occur in businesses, public institutions, and private life [4–6]. Virtually all users of
electronic communication are frequently subject to phishing attempts [6–8]. In light of
this perpetually growing threat, IT security researchers and practitioners have
developed a large variety of anti-phishing measures. Commonly, these are divided into
three categories: Blocking malicious e-mails before they reach users, warning users,
and training users not to fall for phishing [2, 4, 6, 8]. All of these measures are applied
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in practice with some success. Ultimately, however, due to inherent limitations, neither
is effective in preventing phishing attempts from succeeding. While state-of-the-art
phishing detectors that aim to identify and filter out phishing attempts are robust and
versatile, they suffer from their limited accuracy [2, 8, 9]. In order to avoid a high
number of false positives – i.e., mistakenly blocking genuine e-mails – the detectors are
generally tuned for maximum precision [6]. Consequently, many e-mails that a detector
identified as suspicious of constituting a phishing attack reach the user [2, 8, 9].
Therefore, user behavior is of paramount importance in phishing prevention.
While the response rate to phishing e-mails varies widely between users and
particular variants of phishing attacks, on average, 10% to 20% of users that receive a
phishing e-mail act on it [5, 10, 11]. Anti-phishing training aims to reduce this rate by
educating users on how to identify phishing attempts [2, 8]. However, while users
successfully learn to spot telltale signs of phishing, they nevertheless fall for it in
everyday situations, which is overwhelmingly attributed to a lack of awareness when
performing routine tasks in a familiar and trusted environment [10–16]. Existing antiphishing measures that aim to raise the users’ attention, such as warning messages, are
often ignored, as they are perceived as too generic [4, 6–8]. In summary, on the one
hand, the need to avoid false positives prevents phishing detectors from realizing their
full potential [6]. On the other hand, users do not benefit from the knowledge gained in
anti-phishing training and remain susceptible to phishing because, in everyday life, they
lack the required attention [11, 12].
Against this background, approaches from the emerging field of Explainable
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) [17, 18] harbor to date untapped potential for the design
of more effective user-focused anti-phishing measures [9]. In particular, XAI methods
designed to explain the classification of text documents by black-box models [19, 20]
could convey to the user which elements in an e-mail most strongly influenced a
phishing detector in identifying it as suspicious. These explanations, which could be
provided for all e-mails that a detector had to let pass to avoid false positives, constitute
highly specific warnings that are expected to effectively raise the users’ attention [3, 9,
11, 14]. Pursuing this basic idea, we design a novel approach that identifies phishing
cues in suspicious e-mails by generating explanations for the output of a phishing
detector. Thereby, we not only pave the way for more effective user-focused antiphishing measures but provide a glimpse of the potential applications of XAI in the
realm of IT security and beyond.
Following the Design Science methodology [21], the remainder of the paper is
structured as follows: In Section 2, we survey research from the fields of phishing
prevention as well as XAI and conclude with the research gap. Subsequently, in Section
3, we describe the design of a novel XAI approach to extract cues and phrases from emails that contribute to their assessment by a black-box phishing detector. In Section
4, we demonstrate and evaluate the applicability of the approach using a real-world
dataset. Subsequently, in Section 5, we summarize our findings and conclude our paper
with a discussion of the limitations of our research and an outlook on future work.

2

Related Work and Research Gap

To lay the foundation for the design of our novel approach, in the following, we first
summarize research on phishing attacks and the cues based on which both automatic
detectors and users can distinguish phishing attempts from legitimate communication.
Then, we provide a brief overview of existing anti-phishing measures and their
respective strengths and drawbacks. Last, we introduce the research field of
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) and survey XAI methods for explaining
document classification.
2.1

Phishing Attacks and Phishing Cues

Phishing is a social engineering attack that aims to exploit specific weaknesses of users
[4, 5, 7]. The attacker imitates a trustworthy source to gain sensitive information for
malicious purposes [2, 4, 5]. A phishing attack typically consists of three phases [5, 6]:
Circumventing IT security measures (e.g., a phishing detector) to deliver an electronic
communication (e.g., an e-mail) to a user, convincing the user to engage in the intended
activity (e.g., click on a link to a counterfeit website and enter their credit card details),
and finally gaining from the attack (e.g., receive a payment). Most phishing attacks are
carried out via e-mail and traditionally target a broad audience, e.g., all users of a
popular online platform [5–7]. The e-mails include a link to a forged website, where
users are asked to enter their login credentials, on which the attackers then capitalize.
Increasingly, personalized attacks target employees of specific company departments
or public offices using elaborately crafted e-mails that imitate communication by
superiors or co-workers [5–7, 10]. Often, the goal is to initiate large payments or gain
access to confidential information [5, 8, 10].
Researchers have identified cues that are helpful to distinguish between genuine and
phishing e-mails through user studies [10, 13, 14, 22] and analyzing e-mails [3, 14, 23].
Among the main discriminatory elements are the sender’s address and other technical
information in the e-mails’ header, the links included in the e-mail, and words and
phrases in the e-mails’ text [3, 10, 14]. In contrast, the graphical design of an e-mail,
visual elements, and the presence of legal information (e.g., a disclaimer) are of little
informative value [3, 14].
Textual information is arguably the most relevant for users when distinguishing
between genuine and phishing e-mails. On the one hand, increasingly sophisticated
imitation of the style and design of e-mails renders these features unsuitable as
discriminators [11, 14]. On the other hand, textual cues such as urgency require
complex judgment and background knowledge [10, 23]. Thus, in contrast to technical
cues (e.g., URL spoofing), they often cannot be unambiguously detected by automated
filters [5–7]. Indeed, anti-phishing training places emphasis on textual cues and caution
users’ against just considering the superficial properties of an e-mail [3, 11]. Table 1
summarizes typical categories of textual phishing cues.

Table 1. Typical categories of textual cues in phishing e-mails [2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 22, 23]

Category
Urgency
(Appeal to) authority
Importance
Positive consequence (reward)
Negative consequence (loss)
References to security and
safety
Spelling mistakes and
grammatical errors
Lack of personalization
2.2

Example from the IWSPA v2.0 dataset [24]
You have 72 hours to verify the information, …
A message from the CEO …
We have reason to believe that your account was
accessed by a third party.
In return we will deposit $70 to your account …
If you do not verify yourself, your account will
be suspended.
Security is one of our top goals at our company
…
You were qualified to participate in $50.00
reward surwey.
Dear Valued Customer, …

Technical and User-Focused Anti-Phishing Measures

Measures for phishing prevention are commonly divided into technical and userfocused anti-phishing measures. While the former aim to block malicious e-mails
before they reach users, the latter intend to prevent users from falling for phishing
attempts [2, 4, 6].
Technical anti-phishing measures detect phishing e-mails by searching for common
characteristics [6, 7]. Typical approaches include rule-based filters and machinelearning-based detectors [6]. Filters are based on manually assembled blacklists [2, 25]
and are thus inherently constrained to already known cues and patterns [5–7]. In
contrast, machine-learning-based detectors learn to detect phishing e-mails from
training on examples [6]. While earlier approaches relied on predefined features [7],
modern deep learning methods autonomously identify intricate patterns in raw data and
have demonstrated excellent performance in phishing detection [8, 26]. However,
phishing detectors have to be configured such that no genuine e-mail is mistakenly
classified as a phishing attempt and thus discarded [6, 9]. Indeed, it is the “concern over
liability for false positives [that] is the major barrier to deploying more aggressive
heuristics” [6, p. 79], which in turn limits the effectiveness of phishing detectors.
Depending on the type of attack and target audience [cf. 5], studies found that
between 5% and close to 50% of users that receive a phishing e-mail fall for the attempt
[5, 10, 11]. Against this background, user-focused anti-phishing measures aim to reduce
users’ susceptibility to phishing attacks. They comprise anti-phishing training as well
as preventive mechanisms and warning facilities [2, 6]. Trainings aim to raise users’
awareness of the threat and educate them on how to identify phishing attempts. They
are administered in the form of resources for self-study (e.g., texts [8], videos [27], or
games [28, 29]), classroom-style training, and interventional training [2, 8, 10, 11]. In
the course of the latter, imitated phishing e-mails are sent to users. When they fall for
the simulated attack (e.g., by clicking on an included link), they are immediately
presented with self-study material [2, 6, 10]. However, anti-phishing training is not

sufficient to prevent users from falling for phishing attacks [2, 12]. While trainings have
been shown to increase users’ ability to identify phishing attempts when tasked to do
so [2, 6], trained users nevertheless fall for phishing in everyday situations [8].
Researchers have theorized and demonstrated that the cause for users’ high
susceptibility to phishing is their lack of attention when performing routine tasks in a
familiar and trusted environment [8, 12, 16, 30]. It is further amplified by users’
tendency to underestimate their vulnerability to phishing attacks [10, 28, 31]. Thus,
preventive mechanisms such as regular reminders [10], warning messages [4, 10], or
tooltips that help users to evaluate URLs [32] are employed to motivate users to stay
alert and scrutinize all communication for phishing cues [6, 10, 32]. However, users
often overlook or outright ignore these warnings when they are passive indicators or
not perceived as specific and relevant to their current situation [2, 4, 7, 8, 10].
2.3

Explainable Artificial Intelligence and Generation of Explanations for
Document Classification

Since at least the rise of deep learning, AI systems have become ubiquitous. Thus, an
increasing number of people are faced with the consequences of decisions and
recommendations generated by effectively black-box systems [17, 33]. Against this
background, the research field of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) focuses on
automatically generating explanations for AI decisions [17, 18, 33, 34].
XAI methods can be distinguished by their aim and their dependency on a particular
kind of machine learning model [18, 34]. In the context of explanations for AI systems
for text and document classification (such as phishing detectors), both researchers and
practitioners have taken a particular interest in outcome explanations [20, 35]. This kind
of explanation is not concerned with revealing the inner workings of the AI system but
aims to provide a human-understandable reasoning for one specific decision [34, 36].
One avenue to explain an AI system’s decisions in this manner is through local
feature importance [18, 34]. The underlying idea is to assign a weight to each of the
input’s features that reflects how strongly it contributes – positively or negatively – to
the AI system’s decision. The SHAP family constitutes a popular example of such
methods [37]. Some of its variants are model-agnostic, i.e., do not require access to the
AI system’s internals and are thus applicable to any kind of AI system [36, 37]. A study
by Weerts et al. [38] suggests that SHAP explanations succeed in drawing user’s
attention to particularly influential features that they would otherwise have overlooked.
However, explanations based on local feature importance do not necessarily transfer to
other decisions by the same AI system [19, 34].
This limitation is addressed by several more robust XAI methods, which can be
divided into search-based approaches and document classifiers with integrated
explanation capabilities. Martens and Provost [20] define “explanations” as minimal
sets of words that, if removed from the particular document under investigation, change
the classifier’s prediction. To find explanations, they utilize a best-first heuristic search
with search tree pruning. In the case of a non-linear classifier, two post-processing
optimizations aim to ensure that the found set is indeed minimal [20]. Fernandez et al.
[39] generalize this approach to replacing words instead of removing them and

introduce a variable cost for replacement, allowing for more fine-grained control of the
explanations’ properties. Similar to these “explanations,” the “anchors” introduced by
Ribeiro et al. [19] are sets of words. However, instead of constituting a minimal set of
words required for the classification, “anchors” aim to be representative of the AI
system. They are defined as a set of words that, if present, is sufficient to guarantee the
classification independent of changes to the remainder of the document. “Anchors” are
built up word by word through local beam search [19].
Instead of generating explanations post-hoc [34], Lei et al. [35] train two joint
machine-learning models to find explanations for the classification of texts. While an
“encoder” model classifies a text, a “generator” model extracts the corresponding
“rationales,” which are short phrases that, individually, are classified similarly as the
full text. An objective function ensures both correct classification and the “rationales”’
characteristics, namely conciseness and coherence [35, 40]. With their 𝜏-SS3 classifier,
Burdisso et al. [41] again pursue a different approach. 𝜏-SS3 is inherently interpretable,
i.e., the AI system itself transparently reveals which word sequences in a text stream
contributed most to its output.
2.4

Research Gap

Phishing is a pervasive threat for businesses, public institutions, and private individuals
alike. Technical anti-phishing measures filter out malicious e-mails with increasing
effectiveness. However, due to their limited accuracy, phishing e-mails nevertheless
reach the inboxes of users, which consequently have a decisive role to play [2, 6, 7, 9].
Despite efforts to educate users, they frequently fall for phishing attempts, in particular
for those that are sophisticated imitations of genuine e-mails [8, 10]. It is, however,
generally not a lack of knowledge or awareness of the grave consequences but a lack
of attention in everyday situations that makes users vulnerable [10, 12, 16]. Existing
preventive mechanisms such as warning messages often remain without effect, as users
perceive them as too unspecific and disregard them [4, 7, 8, 10].
In light of the power of modern phishing detectors, methods from the field of XAI
appear as a promising foundation for the design of more specific, and thus, more
effective user-focused anti-phishing measures [9]. Following this idea, based on
outcome explanation methods for document classification [19, 20, 35], we design a
novel approach that uncovers words and phrases in e-mails that are telltale signs of
phishing. Our work paves the way for user-focused anti-phishing measures that
effectively raise users’ attention and guide their assessment of suspicious
communication [11, 15, 30, 31]. It further serves as an example of the potential of XAI
methods to address problems of high practical relevance beyond the field of artificial
intelligence.

3

A Novel XAI Approach to Uncover Phishing Cues in E-Mails

We design a novel XAI approach to draw the user’s attention to the telltale signs of
phishing in a suspicious e-mail. The underlying basic idea is to generate explanations
for a phishing detector’s assessment of an e-mail that serve as highly specific warnings.
The starting point for our approach is a phishing detector. In the following, we
describe it as a model 𝑚 that takes an e-mail 𝑥 as its input and outputs a score 𝑠 ∈ [0, 1]
and treat it as a black box otherwise. All incoming e-mails for which 𝑚(𝑥 ) = 𝑠 > 𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ
are considered phishing e-mails and are filtered out before they reach a user’s inbox.
Since the detection threshold 𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ has to be set such that no genuine e-mails are
discarded [cf. 6], many e-mails to which the detector assigns a high score – and thus, a
high likelihood of being a phishing attempt – nevertheless reach the user [6, 8, 9].
Three design decisions characterize our approach. First, to be widely applicable and
to not adversely interfere with the phishing detector’s performance, we design the
approach to be model-agnostic [19, 39]. Second, we focus exclusively on textual cues,
as these are most relevant to distinguish phishing from genuine e-mails and easiest to
assess for laypeople [3, 11, 14, 23]. Third, to assist the users’ assessment, we strive to
highlight precisely the telltale signs of phishing (cf. Table 1 and Figure 1). For this, we
identify the words and phrases in an e-mail that significantly contribute to the phishing
detectors score. In the following, we describe the design of our approach in detail and
elaborate on the design decisions.
3.1

Designing Explanations as Text Highlights

The goal of our approach is to assist users in reliably identifying phishing e-mails. Thus,
the explanations produced by our approach should match how people evaluate e-mails
[11, 33, 42, 43]. Phishing research suggests that textual cues are most relevant to
distinguish between genuine and phishing e-mails (cf. Section 2.1). On the one hand,
textual cues are easiest to comprehend and evaluate for laypeople [3, 14]. On the other
hand, they are the only cues present in types of phishing e-mails that do not rely on
technical manipulation [6, 10, 11].
Against this background, we design our approach to produce explanations in the
shape of text highlights (cf. Figure 1). Specifically, we highlight short sequences of text
[35, 41], which offers three advantages. First, people are familiar with this concept from
everyday life [cf. 42]. Second, the interpretation of the explanations does not require
technical knowledge about their production [19, 44]. Further, the focus on textual cues
avoids the adverse effects of cognitive biases associated with quantitative indicators
such as confidence scores [33]. Third, the interpretation of text highlights demands
substantial cognitive effort and thus encourages thorough evaluation [42], which is
favorable for users’ ability to accurately identify phishing attempts [11, 15, 31].
To formalize the notion of text highlights, we represent an e-mail as a sequence of
words 𝑥 = [𝑥0 , 𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑁 ] [35, 45]. A text highlight explanation can then be
represented by a binary vector 𝑎 of the same length as 𝑥, where 𝑎𝑖 = 1 indicates that
the word 𝑥𝑖 is highlighted and 𝑎𝑖 = 0 indicates that it is not.

3.2

Characteristics of Suitable Explanations

The basic idea of our approach is to convey to the user which words and phrases in an
e-mail influenced a phishing detector’s classification of the e-mail as suspicious. In the
realm of XAI, the task of explaining a model’s output by uncovering which parts of the
input contributed to its assessment has attracted considerable research attention (cf.
Section 2.3). In the following, we draw from this prior work to derive and define the
characteristics of explanations required in our application context.
As worked out in the previous section, our explanations take the shape of text
highlights. To ensure that the highlighted phrases indeed represent phishing cues, we
demand that the phishing detector classifies them as suspicious themselves. In that
regard, the explanations generated by our approach are similar to the “rationales”
proposed by Lei et al. [35]. Taking into account that this assessment might be
coincidental, we require the phrases themselves to be sufficient for the classification of
the entire e-mail. More specifically, similar to the anchors defined by Ribeiro et al. [19],
replacing the remainder of the e-mail with different words should have a negligible
influence on the phishing detector’s assessment [cf. 39].
We capture these characteristics in the concept of a document anchor. For its formal
definition, we resort to the perturbation set 𝐷𝑥 introduced by Ribeiro et al. [19]. For a
given e-mail 𝑥, this set contains all possible variants 𝑧 that can be generated by
replacing words in 𝑥 with either blanks or similar words [19, 39]. A particular sequence
of highlighted words in an e-mail is a document anchor if it is present in most 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥
that are classified similarly as the original e-mail, but not present in the 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 for
which this is not the case. More formally, a text highlight described by a binary vector
𝑎 is a document anchor for 𝑥 if for any 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥
|𝑧⨀𝑎| = |𝑎| ⟹ 𝑚(𝑧) ≥ 𝑚(𝑥 ) − 𝜏,

(1)

where 𝜏 is an application-specific constant.
In general, many document anchors exist for any given e-mail 𝑥. However, not all
of them constitute a good explanation [19, 42]. On the one hand, an anchor that covers
the entire document (𝑎𝑖 = 1 ∀ 𝑖) always fulfills the definition, but conveys no
information to the user that is particularly helpful in distinguishing between phishing
and genuine e-mails. On the other hand, while a few specific words might be sufficient
to guarantee the correct classification, the user perceives text in phrases [41]. Thus,
while prior work strives to find a minimal number of words in an explanation [19, 20,
39], the shortest possible explanation is not necessarily the best in the eyes of the user
[40, 42]. Based on these considerations, we require that the document anchors chosen
as explanations both contain an appropriate number of words and consist of at most a
few connected phrases. We encode these characteristics in an objective function that
takes on a minimum value for an optimal anchor:
𝒪 (a) = (|𝑎| − 𝑙 )2 + 𝛽 ⋅ ∑𝑖 |𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖−1 |

(2)

The first term measures how far the number of highlighted words contained in the
document anchor described by 𝑎 deviates from the desired target 𝑙. The second term
measures the coherence, i.e., the number of connected sequences of words [35]. The

coefficient 𝛽 weights the two terms and allows for fine-tuning of the explanations’
characteristics.
3.3

Model-Agnostic Generation of Explanations for Suspicious E-mails

Up to this point, we have defined the shape of the explanations and developed the
concept of document anchors to capture their desired characteristics. What remains in
the design of our approach is to devise a method that, for a given e-mail 𝑥, generates a
document anchor 𝑎 that minimizes the objective function 𝒪(𝑎) [cf. 19].
As our approach is based on an existing phishing detector, the search for a suitable
anchor cannot make any assumptions regarding the model’s inner workings. Therefore,
we design our approach to be model-agnostic. This not only allows it to be used with
any kind of phishing detector [18, 36]. It further ensures that the phishing detector’s
functionality and performance are not affected in any way [19, 40]. Conversely, the
phishing detector’s properties do not impose restrictions on the design of the method
for the generation of explanations [34, 36].
Incorporating these benefits, we follow the general idea of search-based approaches
[cf. 45]. The basic concept is to find and construct an anchor for an e-mail 𝑥 by probing
the detector with perturbed versions of that e-mail [19, 20, 39]. Addressing the
requirement that our approach should generate explanations that consist of phrases, we
construct an anchor 𝑎 by combining individual phrases 𝑝 (𝑎 = ∑𝑝).
In our approach, we generate perturbed versions 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 by replacing words in the email [19, 39]. In line with the definition of a document anchor, we iteratively search for
phrases 𝑝 that are present in those versions 𝑧 that the detector identifies as suspicious,
but absent from versions of the e-mail that the detector considers genuine. To this end,
we utilize local beam search [19, 45], which we initialize with 𝑁 seed phrases. Each
iteration of the search consists of three steps. First, we generate 𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 child phrases
from each of the 𝑁 phrases by growing, shrinking, or shifting the highlighted sequences
of words. Second, we use the KL-LUCB algorithm [46] to determine the 𝑁 best phrases
among the 𝑁 ⋅ 𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 children [19]. For this, we estimate the expectation value for a
𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 that contains the phrase 𝑝 to be classified as suspicious by the model [19]:
𝔼(𝑝) = 𝔼|𝑧⊙𝑝|=|𝑝| [𝑚(𝑧) ≥ 𝑚(𝑥) − 𝜏]

(3)

We repeatedly refine these estimates until the lower bound on the expectation value of
the 𝑁 𝑡ℎ -best phrase surpasses the upper bound on the next-best phrase’s expectation
value by at least Δ𝑚𝑖𝑛 . The 𝑁 best phrases then form the set of 𝑁 phrases for the next
iteration. To boost convergence, we keep a set of the 𝑁𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 best phrases that we add to
the child phrases in every round of the search [45]. In the third and final step of each
iteration, we merge the current set of 𝑁 phrases to an anchor candidate. If the objective
function’s value for this candidate falls below a previously specified threshold or the
number of iterations surpasses a given maximum, the search terminates. Both the
threshold and the maximum number of iterations, as well as the beam search parameters
𝑁, 𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 , and 𝑁𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 influence the efficiency of the search and the consistency of the
document anchors’ characteristics [19, 45].

4

Demonstration and Evaluation

In the following, as an essential part of the Design Science research process [21], we
demonstrate and evaluate the efficacy of our approach. For this, we instantiate it using
a real-world dataset and conduct a series of summative evaluations adhering to the
Framework for Evaluation in Design Science Research (FEDS) [47].
4.1

Dataset and Phishing Detector

The instantiation and subsequent evaluation of our approach requires a phishing
detector and a set of both phishing and genuine e-mails. We use the English-language
IWSPA-AP v2.0 dataset [24, 26] that was compiled to enable the comparison of
machine-learning-based phishing detectors. It consists of 452 phishing and 3505
legitimate e-mails. We randomly select 80% of each kind for the training set and leave
the remaining e-mails as the test set.
Using the training set, we instantiate a bidirectional LSTM (long short-term
memory) recurrent neural network as the phishing detector, which is a standard model
for text classification [45]. In line with real-world requirements [6], we aim to set the
threshold above which we discard an e-mail as phishing 𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ such that the false
positive rate is minimal. To avoid fatigue due to frequent unsubstantiated warnings, the
threshold 𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝 above which an e-mail is considered suspicious should be set such that
the probability that these e-mails are indeed phishing attempts is reasonably high [6,
10]. We find that for the given detector and dataset, 𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ = 0.98 and 𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝 = 0.20
achieve these goals, resulting in a false positive rate of 0.43% and the classification of
16 genuine and 11 phishing e-mails as suspicious. Just 2.2% of phishing e-mails reach
the user without explanations.
4.2

Instantiation

Our approach generates text highlight explanations by performing a local beam search
guided by an objective function and repeated estimation of the expectation value
𝔼(𝑝) (Eq. 3). Accordingly, in the following, we parametrize the required components.
To generate the samples 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 needed to estimate 𝔼(𝑝), we randomly replace
words in the e-mail 𝑥 with blanks. Since evaluating 𝔼(𝑝) for a given phrase 𝑝 requires
a 𝑧 for which |𝑧⨀𝑝| = |𝑧| (cf. Eq. 3), we can optimize the search’s efficiency by
maximizing the likelihood that this condition is fulfilled. As 𝑝 generally consists of
connected sequences of words, we do not randomly replace words but generate 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥
that each contain a single sequence of varying length. To obtain an unbiased estimate
of 𝔼(𝑝), the unconditional probability 𝑃(𝑚(𝑧) ≥ 𝑚(𝑥 ) − 𝜏) should be close to 0.5.
We find that for the given phishing detector, 𝜏 = 0.15 𝑚(𝑥) is a suitable choice. We
generate at most 1024 samples 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 to limit the load on the phishing detector.
To instantiate the search component, we first parametrize the local beam search. We
use a beamwidth of 𝑁 = 10 and maintain an elite set of size 𝑁𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 = 4. We initialize
the search with randomly placed phrases of three words. In each round, we generate

𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 2 new phrases from each of the 𝑁 current best phrases by appending one word
or shifting them in either direction. Finally, we parametrize the objective function (Eq.
2) with a target length of 𝑙 = 10 and 𝛽 = 4, which we find to strike a suitable balance
between highlighting relevant phishing cues and comprehensibility. We stop when
𝒪 (𝑎) ≤ 16.0 or five iterations have passed. Figure 1 displays an example of an
explanation generated by our approach.

Figure 1. Example of text highlights generated by our approach for a phishing e-mail that seeks
to persuade users to provide their PayPal login credentials by invoking a sense of urgency,
suggesting impending negative consequences, and alluding to standard security practices.

4.3

Evaluation

As suggested by FEDS, we explicate the goals and evaluation strategy before designing
particular evaluation episodes [47]. The goal of the evaluation is to investigate whether
our approach succeeds in generating explanations for suspected phishing attempts that
help users distinguish between genuine and phishing e-mails. Owing to our research's
exploratory nature, the main risks in the design of our approach are technicallyoriented. Thus, FEDS’ “Technical Risk & Efficacy” strategy, which prescribes a series
of increasingly summative and naturalistic evaluations, is an appropriate choice [47].
For the individual evaluation episodes, we utilize the established concept of
functionally-grounded evaluation of explainable systems defined by Doshi-Velez and
Kim [48] and assess explanations using three proxy measures. Each proxy measure
operationalizes a particular goal of our design.
First, the highlighted segments of text should be classified similarly to the entire email, i.e., as suspicious. Thus, we take the score that the phishing detector attributes to
the text highlights as the corresponding proxy measure (Score).
Second, the explanations should be comprehensible for laypeople. For this, an
explanation should consist of connected phrases rather than individual words scattered
across the e-mail. Therefore, we take the number of highlighted sequences as the
corresponding proxy measure (Comprehensibility).
Finally, to draw the users’ attention to those elements in a suspicious e-mail relevant
to assessing the threat, the highlighted parts of the text should represent phishing cues.
To evaluate this, we let two researchers code the words in each of the suspicious emails according to the categories in Table 1 and measure the text highlights’ overlap
with the humans’ assessment. To account for the vastly different amount of phishing
cues in the e-mails (ranging from 0% to 50% of words), we divide this value by the
ratio of cues expected to be found when randomly selecting words to be highlighted
(Relevance).

To benchmark the values obtained for the proxies, we utilize two competing
approaches: As the baseline, we create explanations by randomly highlighting 𝑙 = 10
words in an e-mail (Random). Further, to assess the effect of the information our
approach obtains from the phishing detector, we perform the local beam search with a
fixed 𝔼(𝑝) = 1 (Search-only). To obtain statistically sound conclusions, we apply each
approach fifty times for each of the 27 suspicious e-mails, assess the resulting
explanations, and aggregate the results (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Aggregated evaluation results. The arrows indicate the direction of better values.

We find that our approach outperforms the competing approaches for all three proxy
measures. First, the Score of the text highlights generated by our approach is
significantly higher and exhibits a smaller variance (1st/2nd/3rd quartile .70/.92/.98)
compared to Random (.12/.43/.84) and Search-only (.05/.29/.89). Second, our approach
selects only 2.1 ± 1.0 phrases in an e-mail to be highlighted, rendering its explanations
comprehensible. Third, despite selecting the fewest phrases, the words highlighted by
our approach exhibit higher Relevance for distinguishing between phishing and genuine
e-mails (.99/1.6/2.3) than the text highlights generated by Search-only (.44/.98/1.5),
whose Relevance is similar to that of the Random baseline (.60/.98/1.3). The difference
in Relevance is significant (Mann-Whitney 𝑈 = 1.20 ∙ 106, 𝑛1 = 𝑛2 = 1350,
𝑝 < 10−3 one-sided, effect size 0.66), which validates that through 𝔼(𝑝) our approach
indeed extracts the required information on phishing cues from the detector.
In summary, our approach successfully generates explanations in the shape of text
highlights that are well suited to draw the users’ attention to phishing cues in an e-mail.
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Conclusion, Limitations, and Outlook on Further Research

Phishing is a threat to businesses, public institutions, and private individuals alike.
Current anti-phishing measures ultimately fail at effectively preventing users from
falling for phishing attacks. Against this background, XAI methods offer a promising
path towards more effective user-focused anti-phishing measures that leverage the
power of state-of-the-art phishing detectors. Pursuing this idea, we designed a novel
XAI approach that identifies telltale signs of phishing in suspicious e-mails. Building
on research in phishing susceptibility and anti-phishing training, we designed its
explanations to raise users’ attention and assist their assessment of the potential threat.
We demonstrated our approach utilizing a real-world dataset and a deep learning
phishing detector. Rigorous functionally-grounded evaluation indicates that our

approach succeeds in producing explanations that are both relevant and
comprehensible. In addition to the design of a novel XAI approach, our research
contributes to theory and practice in two ways. On the one hand, it validates the
feasibility of utilizing XAI methods for the design of user-focused anti-phishing
measures. On the other hand, it serves as an example of how XAI methods can be
applied to address problems of high practical relevance beyond the field of AI.
Although our work constitutes a substantial step, it is subject to several limitations
that call for further research. First, by design, our approach can only uncover cues and
phrases that the phishing detector identifies as suspicious. While our demonstration
suggests that the detectors’ assessment matches that of users, this might not be the case
for any phishing detector, restricting the applicability of our approach. Second,
although we utilized a real-world dataset, a real phishing detector, and included human
labelers, our evaluation is nevertheless artificial. With the technical design risks out of
the way, an evaluation based on established concepts for the evaluation of user-focused
anti-phishing measures is an essential next step. Third, while the design of the
explanations was informed by research in phishing susceptibility, our approach in itself
does not constitute a full user-focused anti-phishing measure. Further development
towards its real-world application will, amongst others, require extensive user interface
design. These limitations notwithstanding, our approach provides a first glimpse of the
exciting potential of XAI methods for applications in IT security and beyond.
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